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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper investigates the prevailing financing models that are used to finance 
microbusinesses in developing economies with the objective of adapting one of these models 
for use within the South African context. Using India, Brazil, Ghana and Kenya as case 
studies the current successful microfinancing models and their advantages and disadvantages 
in these countries are assessed. The results indicate that microleasing is a possible effective 
financing model that can be used to finance microbusinesses in South Africa. Furthermore, 
possible ways of addressing microleasing shortfalls are explored in the paper, by drawing on 
the suitable features of financing innovations developed in the other developing economies. 
Most importantly, it was also found that the government, donors and the private sector have a 
significant role to play in order to encourage further development of the nascent microfinance 
industry in South Africa.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Problem statement 
There is high demand for capital to finance microbusinesses in South Africa (Berry and Von 
Blottnitz, 2002). This demand is widespread in South Africa and overwhelms even the 
financial institutions which provide the much needed financial services. Consequently, there 
is general interest, both in government and the private sector, in finding sustainable financing 
solutions. South African financial institutions have developed great interest in this 
undertaking because of its economic and social values. These institutions have realised, 
evidently, that South Africa will turn out to be more economically productive as more 
businesses thrive. Many may have recognised that entrepreneurship enhances economic 
productivity and increases South Africans’ chances at a brighter future through reducing 
unemployment and alleviating poverty (Nigrini, 2002). Moreover, entrepreneurship is a 
growing trade that promises rewarding prospects, for both the capital providers and the 
entrepreneurs. 
 
Among the many government programmes being implemented to better the lives of many 
South Africans, entrepreneurship seems to be the most economically viable and beneficial. In 
the urban areas of the country, especially in Gauteng, people engaging in some form of 
entrepreneurship abound. Despite a large number of alternative economic growth 
programmes, the value of entrepreneurship, which can be achieved through getting the right 
product, right market, right business skills and right funding, is so great in that many South 
Africans can provide their families better chances of getting reasonable earnings and 
affording better living conditions. For entrepreneurship to thrive, however, one of the most 
important requirements is getting reasonable access to capital (Kaniki, 2007). Capital is the 
engine of commerce essential to ensure that budding entrepreneurs are able to start their 
businesses. With sufficient capital, these businesses have a better chance to become 
successful, as long as the entrepreneurs acquire the necessary and relevant skills to make the 
businesses sustainable (Kesper, 2000). This is the conventional idea of many entrepreneurs 
and policymakers.  
 
However, it has been mentioned several times in the literature that getting access to capital is 
not easy for entrepreneurs (Berry and Von Blottnitz, 2002). This is especially true in South 
    

Africa. There are many government programmes that have been implemented to bridge this 
gap and assist entrepreneurs but have been met with limited success in the market (Baumann, 
2001). Hence it needs to be investigated, in order to determine if there is another model from 
other developing economies that can be adopted to enhance the ability of entrepreneurs to 
access capital effectively better than the current models? To answer this question, the 
effectiveness of current models used by government and financial institutions has to be 
explored. One of the models employed by entrepreneurs is getting finance from a third party 
(mostly financial institutions, e.g., banks), which can be a difficult and lengthy procedure 
with a lot of “red tape” (Kanini, 2007). 
 
External financing is one of the most important methods of obtaining capital for 
entrepreneurs anywhere in the world (Ojah, 2009). Studies have shown that in order to start a 
business the available options to getting capital are: cash from friends, cash from family, cash 
from financial institutions or own private savings if available (Berry and Von Blottnitz, 
2002). The first three, which are a form of getting capital from a third party, are the most 
prevalent as already mentioned above. It comes most commonly as equity (where the investor 
takes partial ownership in the business) or debt (where the investor provides a loan to the 
owner and expects to be compensated in the form of interest payments and payback of the 
principal). Another form of financing is where an entrepreneur obtains funding from a 
philanthropist in the form of a gift. In this case the philanthropist does not expect any 
financial compensation for his gift. However, this method is not going to be explored in this 
research, as it is not that common and not sustainable from the donor’s perspective. This 
study will only focus on sustainable models where the relevant investor expects a return on 
their investment.   
 
From the perspective of this research, a fundamental assumption regarding the efficacy of 
these financing models is that such models must also provide the entrepreneur with basic 
skills for running a business especially during the early stages, for the business to have a 
better chance of success. The goal of such financing models should be to enable reasonable 
access to capital and to foster the rapid acquisition of basic business skills, to facilitate 
cashflow management and growing the business. The direct and indirect stakeholders in the 
business consist of the entrepreneurs and the financiers. By extension, communities as a 
    

whole and the relevant industry have an indirect but significant stake, in the outcome and 
success of the business and the financing models that are used to finance them.  
 
This study is mainly concerned with the evaluation of current financing models (referred to as 
microfinance) for microbusinesses. Microfinance serves as an umbrella term that describes 
the provision of banking services by poverty-focused financial institutions (microfinance 
institutions – MFIs) to poor parts of the population that are not being served by mainstream 
financial services providers. The core service of microfinance is credit and typically these are 
small loans to the poor (Deutsche Bank Research, 2007). Ultimately, this research seeks to 
develop a more appropriate microfinance model for microbusinesses in South Africa. 
 
1.2 Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this study is to identify current financing models that are used to fund 
microbusinesses in developing countries, understand the benefits and constraints of these 
financing models and then propose a sustainable financing model that will lead to more 
microbusinesses succeeding in South Africa.  
 
1.3 Research questions  
The proposed research is suggesting that a detailed investigation of the current methods of 
financing microbusinesses will reveal gaps that can lead to a more refined and effective 
solution. Specifically, the research paper will address the following research questions: 
 
a. What financing models currently exist in developing countries? 
b. What are the features, benefits and constraints of these models? 
c. What model is best for microbusinesses in South Africa? 
 
1.4  Significance of the study 
Entrepreneurship is viewed as an important development policy tool by many policy makers 
(Reinke, 1998). The development of techniques to improve the financing of these businesses 
is also a goal of the National Youth Development Agency. Qualitative research has become 
increasingly common in the field of developing financing solutions. The proliferation of 
qualitative studies on various aspects has been unprecedented. Despite its new prominence in 
    
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South Africa, however, concerns remain about the ability of the current financing models to 
resolve the practical problems that entrepreneurs face in accessing funds (Ojah and Mokoteli, 
2010). A key factor accounting for the perceived lack of effectiveness of the financing 
models is the relative absence of efforts from commercial banks and the inability of these 
institutions to implement effectively some of the recommended solutions. The research 
carried out in this study should provide a relevant and practical financing model that can be 
used for microbusinesses in South Africa. This model can then be rolled out provincially and 
nationally within South Africa. 
 
1.5  Research methodology 
Using historical research, this study will be carried out by construing three specific areas in 
literature: (1) the type of models that are being used in developing countries to finance 
microbusinesses; (2) the advantages and disadvantages posed by these solutions from the 
perspective of the microbusinesses and the finance providers; and (3) developing a 
sustainable solution that will work best for the microbusinesses and close the gaps posed by 
the current models in South Africa. Each aspect is well documented in literature and thus 
represents a rich opportunity for detailed analysis of the research questions described above.  
To analyse these areas, published papers and articles will be studied in detail to outline the 
current models. Furthermore, these models will be deconstructed to establish the current gaps 
in meeting their mandate of providing financing to microbusinesses in an affordable and 
sustainable way. In addition, these solutions will be compared to each other to determine their 
advantages and disadvantages. Data studied will include the examination of popular essays, 
books and other relevant materials. Finally, the above body of knowledge will be used to 
develop a sustainable financing model for South Africa which will attempt to close the gaps 
left open by the current models. 
Interpretation and analysis of these materials will remain open to various scientific 
explanations. However, the focus will primarily investigate the usefulness and relevance of 
the current models to meet the expectations of the market they seek to serve. Current models 
may be limited in that they do not understand the practical needs and intricacies of the market 
they are trying to serve. In order to examine the validity of this hypothesis, the needs of this 
market as documented in literature will be contrasted with the solutions that are currently 
    
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being provided by government and financial institutions. To determine the benefits of these 
models, each of the models will be examined in relation to the problems that they are able to 
solve. In this regard, the analysis will then be useful in developing a solution that will serve 
to effectively meet the needs of the market. In conducting the analysis, however, this research 
will carefully avoid the constraints of developing solutions that will only work for a 
sophisticated market that is already used to utilising financial services.  
Furthermore, this research will demonstrate how the developed solution can close the current 
gaps in the market that are not met by the current financing models. The data that will be 
analysed will be publications, articles, books and other material between 1990 and 2010 in 
South Africa, and other developing countries. Data between this period is readily available 
and is relevant in that during this time the government of South Africa and private sector 
were very active in attempting to find a solution for financing microbusinesses in South 
Africa. Sources of data that have been identified include, but not limited to, Statistics South 
Africa, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, economic and financial journals, bank 
websites and other useful sources. 
 
1.6  Background literature  
According to Statistics South Africa’s Labour Force Survey for 2010 (Quarter 1), 
unemployment remains high at 25.2%. With the rate of unemployment being very high, 
people without an income represent a significant portion of the South African population. 
Due to the social and economic pressures of modern life, the absence of a stable income often 
has a devastating effect on the lives of the affected persons. The unemployed and unskilled 
often find it difficult to find employment, even though the desire to work is often present (Du 
Toit, 2003). 
The key to effectively reducing unemployment and poverty in South Africa appears to be 
entrepreneurship (Makina and Malobola, 2004). The benefits of entrepreneurship for both 
developed and developing countries are well known and documented (Wennekers and 
Thurik, 1999; Schramm, 2006; Acs and Szerb, 2007 and Klapper et al, 2007). However, the 
willingness of commercial banks to provide credit to microbusinesses, or even the low-
income segment, has been limited despite supporting initiatives from the government. 
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According to Pillay and Naude (2005), a lack of knowledge on the borrowing behaviour, 
preferences and experiences of the low income segment in accessing finance from the 
commercial banking sector in South Africa is a major barrier for banks. Entrepreneurship 
may be even more crucial for a country such as South Africa because of the psychological 
benefits as well as the physiological benefits that can be derived therein. The incentives of 
owning a successful business include a stable income for the individual and constructive 
economic participation which is beneficial to the community. Furthermore, it has positive 
social integrative effects by enabling individuals to experience success and contribute 
positively to the economy. 
Compared to Asian countries, the contribution of small and microbusinesses  to South 
Africa's GDP is far lower, however, as South Africa is seen to be less entrepreneurial than 
other developing countries (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, 2009). This could impact 
negatively on the country’s job creation opportunities and economic growth. Furthermore, the 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2009 Report found that South Africa is below the average 
rate of entrepreneurial activity compared to the other countries taking part in the survey. 
South Africa is ranked lowest of all developing countries that are part of the survey, including 
Chile, Brazil, Tunisia, India, Argentina and Thailand. There are several reasons mentioned in 
the report for the low level of entrepreneurship in South Africa which include: 1) limited 
access to capital, 2) lack of business skills required to run a business successfully, and 3) 
misdirected government support and bureaucratic red tape. 
 
According to the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR, 2008-2009), the high level of crime 
was ranked as the second most problematic factor for doing business in South Africa. The 
right kind of access to capital can lead to more successful microbusinesses being started as 
well as higher economic participation and possibly reduced risk of crime linked to 
unemployment. 
 
Having discussed the objectives, the significance of this study and the research methodology 
employed therein, the rest of the paper is divided into four sections. The first section (chapter 
2) discusses case studies from four developing economies (India, Brazil, Kenya and Ghana) 
which are facing similar economic and socio-political challenges to South Africa. There are 
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many similarities that India and Brazil share with South Africa, economically and socio-
politically (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, 2009). One of them being that the income 
distribution gap between the rich and the poor is among the largest in the world for India, 
Brazil and South Africa. On the other hand, Kenya and Ghana were chosen because 
enterprise finance models for small and micro businesses are taken seriously in these African 
countries. To that end, these countries serve as an appropriate base to seek lessons that can be 
applied within the South African context as they face similar economic development 
challenges as South Africa. The second section (chapter 3) presents an analysis of the 
prevailing Small Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMME) financing models in South Africa. 
The third section (chapter 4) then develops an argument for a microfinance model that can be 
applied in South Africa by considering all the best-practices from the other developing 
economies. The paper ends with concluding remarks (chapter 5) regarding the proposed 
financing model and the suggested way forward for the South African microfinance industry 
in general. 
 
1.7  Outline of the Study 
1.7.1 Introduction 
1.7.2 Literature Review 
1.7.3 Prevailing SMME Financing Models In South Africa 
1.7.4 Proposed Financing Model For Microbusinesses In South Africa  
1.7.5 Concluding Remarks 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Microfinance models in developing countries 
2.1.1 India 
The history of rural credit, poverty alleviation and microfinance are inextricably interwoven 
in India. Since gaining independence from Britain, institutional credit was perceived as a 
significant instrument for enhancing production and productivity and for alleviating poverty 
in India. The institutional vehicles chosen to expand credit to the rural population in a timely 
and sufficient manner were cooperatives, commercial banks and Regional Rural Banks 
(RRBs). However there has been a gap between these objectives and the reality in India due 
to defects in policy design, infirmities in implementation and the inability of government to 
desist from resorting to measures such as loan waivers. Consequently, the banking sector was 
not able to understand lending to the poor as a viable and profitable activity but only as a 
social obligation (Thorat, 2006). 
 
Hence, the financial sector had to wait several decades in order for the microfinance model to 
be considered credible. Policy planners began the search for products and services that would 
enable the financial system to provide products to the poor and rural population. The 
relentless search discovered that the poor tend to – and could be induced to – come together 
in a variety of informal ways for pooling their savings and dispensing small and unsecured 
loans at varying costs to group members on the basis of need (Thorat, 2006).  
 
Microfinance in India started in the early 1980s, with a small effort to form informal self-help 
groups (SHG) that provide access to savings accounts and credit services. From this small 
beginning, the microfinance sector has grown significantly in the past decades. National 
bodies such as the Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI) and the National 
Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) are devoting significant time and 
financial resources on microfinance. This signifies the growing importance of the sector. The 
strength of the Indian microfinance organisations (MFOs) lies is in the diversity of 
approaches and techniques that have evolved over time. In addition to the home-grown 
models of SHGs and mutually aided cooperative societies (MACS), the country has learnt 
from other microfinance initiatives from across the world, particularly Bangladesh, 
Indonesia, Thailand, and Bolivia, in terms of delivery of microfinance services. India, where 
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more than 300 million people live on less than $1 a day, is viewed as an especially significant 
laboratory for microfinance (Sriram and Upadhyayula, 2002). 
 
One of the most successful and fastest growing MFIs operating in the country is SKS 
Microfinance which was set up by Vikram Akula in 1998 to provide microfinance to the 
poorest sections of the Indian society that earns a per capita income less than $120 per year. 
The MFI targets only women and uses the group-lending model as collateral which was 
popularised by the Grameen Bank. In this model, the women must apply for loans in groups 
of four or five, and because none can ask for additional funds until each member of the group 
pays back her loan, peer pressure lowers default rates. Women are preferred in this case 
because research has shown that women are more likely than men to reinvest business 
earnings in their households and to support others in their borrowing group (Deutsche Bank 
Research, 2007 and Akula, 2008).  
 
By negating the traditional assumption that microcredit is not a viable business in developing 
countries, SKS brought a new technologically-savvy microfinancing model in India, which is 
profitable and self-sustaining. By reducing costs through prevention of wastage at each step 
of the loan process, combined with innovative technologies and an efficient management 
system, SKS has transformed into one of the fastest growing microfinance institutions in the 
world. From the onset, the strategic goal of SKS’s founder was to model the business on 
McDonald's and Starbucks by using technology and standardised systems to wring enough 
efficiency out of each tiny transaction to lower unit costs. By attracting capital from global 
financial institutions such as Citibank and through its automated Management Information 
System (MIS) and its SmartCards Pilot Project, SKS has been able to grow rapidly (Rupesh, 
2006). 
 
To craft and execute a competitive advantage, SKS focuses on operational efficiency and 
continuous improvement of its model at every part of the lending value chain.  A key feature 
of the SKS business model is the computerised “Smart Card” introduced in 2000. Each 
borrower in the village is given a card, which is then inserted in the handheld computer 
(HHC) carried by the loan officer at which point the two gadgets synchronise with each other. 
The information from the HHC is then transferred to the branch office computer, where all 
the accounts are automatically updated. This considerably reduces the time consumed in 
    
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processing loan transactions, enabling the staff to carry out additional meetings in limited 
time. Moreover, by creating simple loan management accounting software which can be used 
by loan officers with no computer experience, SKS reduced the time spent on accounting 
matters from several hours to minutes (Bhatnagar et al., 2002).   
 
The MFI achieves efficiency by also using some simple but effective rules such as requiring 
borrowers to pay the same amount periodically in exact change, instead of allowing coins and 
letting borrowers pay whatever amount. The impact of this results in fast turnaround times for 
loan officers, which then allows them to visit more villages each day (3 instead of 1) and 
handle more borrowers at each meeting (50 instead of 20). At one point in time, the MFI was 
dangerously exposed to one business sector, SKS management was able to respond quickly 
and source borrowers from other business sectors such as tractor repair, brick making, tire re-
treading and tea shops. In this instance, through built-in early warning mechanisms, the 
software enabled SKS to diversify its loan portfolio risk by including borrowers from other 
business sectors (Bellman, 2006).   
 
SKS estimates that poor households in India have borrowed approximately $1.8 billion from 
microlenders in the period between 2001 and 2006. However, the MFI believes that they 
could borrow more than 20 times that amount if they had financial institutions that could 
bring simple and affordable lending to each village. Spread across rural India, this approach 
to tiny financial transactions plays well into the social development agenda of India's ruling 
coalition, which assumed power in 2004 with the promise of driving India's growth in the 
rural areas in a sustainable way. These small, income generating loans have had a tremendous 
impact on the lives of female borrowers and their families in India. Hence, India's central 
bank is very optimistic about the microfinance model such that it recently changed its 
regulations to allow small rural institutions to act as agents for banks (Bellman, 2006). 
 
Moreover, adding to its success is the fact that SKS has also been able to raise money from 
the private sector including ICICI Bank, India’s largest private-sector bank by capital, and 
foreign institutions such as Citigroup and Sequoia Capital. The private-equity giant Sequoia 
Capital invested $11.5 million in SKS Microfinance, in March 2007. Due to Sequoia’s status 
as a commercial venture capital fund with prior investments in companies such as Yahoo! 
and Google, the deal was heralded as the first purely for-profit private equity undertaking in 
    
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the microfinance industry. As a true sign of its commercial viability, SKS has since made 
plans to list its shares on the Indian stock exchange during 2010. Partnering with and raising 
money from the private sector has been one of the foremost strategies of the MFI in order to 
ensure its long-term sustainability and viability of its model (Sloand, 2010). 
 
In 1998, SKS was able to drop its annual interest rates from 36% to around 24% due to its 
more-efficient systems. At that time, these rates were lower than what most people paid for 
credit-card debt in the cities. Most importantly, this rate was less than half that charged by 
many rural loan sharks, who have been blamed for the rise in suicides by farmers who faced 
ruin in the past year when their crops failed. SKS's next product development is to bring 
health and crop insurance to the poor in an affordable and sustainable manner. It also hopes 
to use Visa's card technology to make microloans as simple and inexpensive as getting cash 
from an ATM (Bellman, 2006). As of March 31, 2010, SKS had 6.78 million female 
borrowers and total disbursements worth more than $3 billion, and many of its clients are 
repeat borrowers (SKS Annual Report, 2010). 
 
SKS provides many important lessons for MFIs in that it takes a very capitalistic approach to 
building its business model while at the same time meeting the needs of its clients in the rural 
areas. Akula (2008) and Bhatnagar et al. (2002) summarise effectively in a concise way the 
various lessons that the SKS business model offers in establishing and managing a next-
generation MFI. The key lessons are summarised below: 
• Scalability is very important - ensure that the business model can be scaled up quickly in 
order to grow the business rapidly and increase the number of customers especially since 
margins are low when dealing with the bottom end of the income pyramid. 
• Adopt a profit-oriented approach in order to be able to access commercial capital from 
commercial banks, private equity players and other investors seeking high returns. 
• Standardise products, training and other frontline and back-end processes in order to 
boost capacity by adopting business principles used by companies such as McDonald’s 
and Starbucks. 
• Implement easy-to-use technology such as the SKS Smart Card system to reduce costs 
and limit errors and manipulation by eliminating arduous paper-based and manually 
driven processes. 
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• Entrench customer loyalty – engage clients in a culturally appropriate way, by using local 
knowledge, an MFI is then able to design a set of products and delivery mechanism tailor-
made for that community. 
• Seek other revenue streams by leveraging the company brand and partnering with other 
service providers and thus offering complementary products, this enhances the 
profitability and sustainability of the MFI. 
 
2.1.2 Brazil 
Brazil has a huge potential for the microfinance industry, considering the fact that it has a 
large population, with over 174 million people. Furthermore, Brazil has the largest economy 
in South America with an estimated GDP of US$ 503.9 billion in 2001. Despite the country’s 
wealth, Brazil has the highest number of poor citizens in South America and this equates to 
an environment conducive to microfinance. The income inequality is among the highest in 
the world, with the richest 10% of citizens receiving 48.9% of total income. Hence due to this 
skew, a high proportion of the population has a need for microfinance services (Nichter et al., 
2002).  
 
Despite the seemingly conducive environment for microfinance, the industry has not 
flourished as one would expect but has experienced slow growth rates since its first 
introduction in 1973. The industry has only had a low penetration of about 2% of the 
country’s estimated 8.2 million microbusinesses. Different factors have been given as the 
reasons for the low take-off of the industry including the harsh economic climate before 
1994, a strong presence of government-subsidised credit initiatives and an inadequate 
regulatory framework, among others. These barriers limit the emergence of sizeable MFIs 
and create several challenges for the microfinance industry (Nichter et al., 2002).  
 
However, in recent years the microfinance industry has grown substantially and the majority 
of this growth stems from just one MFI, Banco do Nordeste , a public regional bank, which 
grew from 35,322 clients in December 1999 to 85,309 clients in December 2001 (Nichter et 
al., 2002). Its most successful product, CrediAmigo, which is aimed at microbusinesses, 
serves almost one-half of the total number of microcredit customers in the country. What 
added to the success of the Crediamigo product is that the bank spent considerable money 
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and resources to understand the needs of the microbusiness sector before developing it 
(Young and Fiori, 2005).   
 
The bank carried out extensive research before launching the programme. The research found 
that most microbusinesses do not borrow from conventional commercial banks, and those 
that do use credit depend more on suppliers, family, and moneylenders. This is despite the 
fact that the monthly interest paid, to the suppliers and moneylenders, is higher particularly 
when compared to the credit products offered by the public banks. The main reason given by 
microbusinesses for not obtaining bank credit is the difficulty they face in meeting 
documentation and credit guarantee requirements. Moreover, suppliers and moneylenders 
tend to provide a more flexible lending environment and greater convenience compared to 
conventional banks (Schonberger, 2001). Taking these needs into account the bank then 
innovated to develop the CrediAmigo programme. Table 1 below shows an overview of the 
CrediAmigo microfinance programme developed by Banco do Nordeste. 
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Table 1: Overview of CrediAmigo programme offered by Banco do Nordeste in Brazil 
 
Name  CrediAmigo 
Institutional type Bank division 
Operation began November 1997 
Source of funds Transfers from parent Banco do Nordeste 
Geographic region Northeast region 
Estimated market 2.5 million 
Number of branches* 51 
Guarantees Solidarity group 
Average term (months) 3 
Nominal interest rate (monthly) 5% 
Frequency of repayment Every 15 days 
Total disbursed US$39.1 million 
Number of loans disbursed 121,444 
Outstanding portfolio US$8.2 million 
Number of loans outstanding 34,085 
Average outstanding balance US$241 
Number of loan officers 213 
Clients per loan officer 153 
Loan officer education level Secondary graduates and college graduates 
Loan officer base salary US$211 
Incentive (% of base salary) Average 40% 
Other services Training 
Note: Figures are as of July 31, 1999. *"Branches" refers to any permanent physical location used as an 
operational base by the microfinance institution. 
Source: Schonberger (2001) 
 
CrediAmigo defines its market as regional and has pursued a high-growth strategy since its 
inception. The programme is not leveraged from deposit accounts or loans from private banks 
but receives commercial funds through its parent company. Even though the programme falls 
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within a regulated financial institution, it has its own customised disbursement and repayment 
windows. Other programmes in Brazil are offered by NGOs and disburse money through 
cheques which are cashed at banks, and these banks also accept loan repayments. Most of 
these programmes are funded through grants while others through low-interest, long-term 
loans. These programmes have also largely benefited from international institutions for grants 
and technical assistance for designing the programmes and for institution building activities. 
Furthermore, these programmes focus on specific geographic areas based on the 
municipalities where they operate. However, CrediAmigo follows the strategy of its parent, 
Banco do Nordeste, and takes a wider regional approach. In this case it benefits through 
economies of scale provided by its parent company (Schonberger, 2001). 
 
Consequently, the impact of the CrediAmigo programme has made a difference in that 
CrediAmigo accounts for 58 percent of active loans in the Northeast region and for 63 
percent of all customers, further indicating that the programme’s strategies are working 
successfully. In the absence of credit guarantees the programme uses the solidarity group-
lending model to address this issue. The programme also offers the flexibility in repayment 
frequency to better match the cashflow patterns of its clients. This has allowed clients to take 
up larger loans as they establish a reliable record with the MFI of repaying their loans (Young 
and Fiori, 2005).    
 
Due to low productivity, the salaries of loan officers are generally low. CrediAmigo loan 
officer salaries are typically US$300 per month whereas other similar programmes pay about 
US$500 per month on average. In the case of the other programmes the larger salaries are due 
in part to high productivity of the loan officers. However this has not negatively impacted on 
the success of CrediAmigo. Most of the programmes also offer their clients additional 
services such as training as they believe that this will enable the microbusinesses to flourish 
and thus improve their ability to repay the loans. But this is not a requirement for getting 
approval for a loan. Future services being considered by CrediAmigo include offering a 
savings product, as an additional source of funding for loan funds. Since it is part of a 
regulated financial institution, Banco do Nordeste, it is legally able to offer such a product 
(Schonberger, 2001).  
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However the microfinance industry in Brazil still faces major challenges which prevent it 
from reaching its full potential. Even though the macroeconomic environment has improved, 
the MFI sector has grown slower than other credit products. These challenges include a 
confusing regulatory environment which changes frequently. As a result, clear information is 
not widely available regarding the laws and permitted activities under which MFIs should 
operate. The lack of transparency and standardisation has prevented other MFIs from learning 
from each other in terms of which strategies work and which ones should be avoided. For 
example, Banco do Nordeste which offers the CrediAmigo programme is not open about its 
best practices, hence other MFIs cannot learn from it. Moreover, cheap public sector credit 
lines which focus on agriculture have had the negative impact of creating the impression to 
rural clients that credit is cheap. In addition, rural clients assume that loans need not be paid 
back. As a result, this has made it difficult for MFIs to penetrate rural areas and build 
sustainable business models (Nichter et al., 2002).  
 
Even though Banco do Nordeste is not open about its best practices, the CrediAmigo 
programme offers several lessons in terms of the endless possibilities within the MFI 
industry, as already discussed above. The key lesson is that this model shows that commercial 
banks or state-owned banks, with a substantial capital base, can play a significant role within 
the microfinance sector, especially if they form an autonomous division within the bank that 
primarily focuses on providing tailor-made microfinance products to the poor and SMMEs. 
 
2.2 Microfinance models in Africa 
2.2.1 Kenya 
In Kenya, as in many African countries, providing financial services to poorer populations in 
rural areas remains a challenging goal. The rural environment of Kenya is characterised by 
poor communications infrastructure, low population density, low levels of literacy, 
undiversified economies, low profitability and high risk economic activities. Consequently, it 
has thus far proved unattractive to NGO microfinance institutions (MFIs) and commercial 
financial institutions (Johnson et al., 2005). 
 
The microfinance industry is relatively new in Kenya with the sector gaining industry status 
in the last 10 years or so, according to Hospes et al. (2002). In the past 20 years the sector has 
seen a lot of MFIs being set up to take advantage of providing financial services to the under-
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served poor in the country. In addition, the Kenyan government and international donor 
agencies have also played a major role in boosting the sector. The government of Kenya 
regarded the lack of access to credit as the major bottleneck to economic growth and 
enterprise development. As a result the international donor agencies donated about 
$80million to the development of microbusinesses in Kenya between 1995 and 2001.  
 
The major beneficiaries of these funds were the Kenya Rural Enterprise Development 
Programme (K-Rep) and Kenya Women Finance Trust (KWFT). K-Rep is widely considered 
as the forerunner of NGO Microfinance in Kenya. Its philosophy during inception was the 
provision of minimalist financial services (loans and deposits) to existing entrepreneurs and 
not necessarily people who required to be trained to become entrepreneurs. In order to 
increase its chances of survival as a financing solution, K-Rep reduced the number of NGOs 
it supported from twelve to five, and also decided to establish KWFT. K- Rep, inspired by the 
Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, adopted the group-lending model in its microfinance 
initiatives and also encouraged other MFIs to follow suit. As a result of this adaptation, 
Kenya evolved mainly as the “Bangladesh of Africa” (Hospes et al., 2002).  
 
The Kenyan financial services environment is not different to other developing economies in 
the sense that traditional commercial banks are reluctant to lend to the microbusiness sector, 
because MFI borrowers seldom have any credit history or assets that they can use as security. 
The reasons cited are that financial institutions are not located in rural Kenya because of the 
perceived high transaction costs and risks. Hence, the majority of people living in rural areas 
do not have the time and money for a trip to the bank that exists in the major towns. 
Consequently, a small number of banks have ventured into developing credit products 
targeted specifically for microbusinesses. As a result of these barriers, MFIs such as K-Rep 
are widely regarded as the best hope for Kenyans in the rural areas to receive access to credit 
due to their innovative and flexible approaches. Some of these approaches include: 
minimalist versus integrated approaches and group-lending models versus individual-lending 
models. The minimalist approach focuses specifically on providing microloans to 
microbusinesses and the integrated approach bundles other value-added services.  
 
In addition, the group-lending schemes organise clients into groups to attain economies of 
scale from the small sized transactions and establishing group-guarantee mechanisms. K-Rep 
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has also established Financial Services Associations (FSAs) which are aimed at increasing 
outreach to the rural areas. FSAs are based on internal member resources where members buy 
equity in the credit fund. By using FSAs, K-Rep is hoping to invent a low-cost model of 
establishing new MFI-type programmes and also diversify its clientele in the process (Hospes 
et al., 2002).  
 
Although these programmes have been largely successful, it has been found that clients cite 
several reservations with regard to the lending practices used by institutions such as K-Rep. 
Clients mention that they do not like the group-lending model as it is unnerving to take into 
account the behaviour of other people in the group. Other clients also state that they dislike 
the mandatory weekly meetings due to the lengthy time that these sessions take. Others 
would like to have more control over the deal terms of the loans regarding size, time and 
interest rates that are charged. 
  
Table 2: Geographical outreach of banking institutions involved in microfinance in 
Kenya (as per December 31st of 2000) 
 
 
Source: Hospes et al. (2002) 
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By the end of May 2001 the total loan portfolio of the five banking institutions involved in 
microfinance was Kshs 1 billion. More than 60% of the loan customers were K-Rep bank 
customers. Furthermore, the deposits mobilised from 33, 689 customers were over Kshs. 
467.3 million, of which 70% of the customers belonged to K-Rep Bank. Clearly, K-Rep 
specialises in providing microfinance to the poor and thus provides the largest number of 
microloans compared to the other financial institutions. It has also been widely reported to 
have the highest geographical coverage among MFIs that target small-scale microbusinesses. 
Moreover, studies have shown that other banks that play in this market are only focused on 
providing savings accounts as opposed to loans.  
  
Most notably K-Rep, has been largely successful in reaching its mission of  “empowering 
low income people, serving as a catalyst for them to increase their participation in the 
development process and enhance their quality of life” due to its unrelenting focus on its 
mandate. The development of microbusinesses was at its core from its inception in 1984. Not 
only did K-Rep focus on supplying much needed financial services to microbusinesses, but it 
also expanded its programmes and included providing management and financial services to 
NGOs involved in the development of microbusinesses. 
 
To this end, the MFI has been successful in making financial services available to 
microbusinesses that have not accessed credit through conventional banking institutions. 
Having clear and altruistic objectives, allowed K-Rep to receive generous funds and support 
from international donors. These funds and professional support enabled the organisation to 
establish three distinct agencies under the umbrella name K-Rep Holding: K-Rep 
Development Agency (non-profit organisation); K-Rep Advisory Services (consultancy firm) 
and K-Rep Bank Limited (for-profit organisation). The overall objective of K-Rep Holding is 
to generate employment and increase incomes by expanding financial services to the poor 
(Hospes et al., 2002).  
 
In essence, the strategy used by K-Rep Holding is two-fold: (1) Identify, test and develop 
new microfinance products that increase access to financial services for the poor and (2) 
create institutions that can deliver these services in a sustainable way. This effective strategy 
has allowed the MFI to deliver results to 21 different districts in Kenya which are home to 
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some of the poorest communities in the country. In various pilot projects, the client 
composition by gender has been 52% male, 44% female and 4% groups. This is further 
evidence to its goal of providing financial services to a diverse group of people in the most 
remote areas in Kenya. The over-arching key to the success of such programmes is that they 
are run professionally from inception and are staffed by professional people with the 
appropriate skills to execute on the mandate from the private sector, donors and government. 
The K-Rep Development Agency’s positive experience in turning around MFIs that are 
performing poorly, serves as a good lesson of the prospects that world-class professional 
management can offer to nascent MFIs operating in other developing economies (Johnson et 
al., 2005).     
 
2.2.2 Ghana 
In Ghana, it has also been discovered that microbusinesses and poor individuals have very 
limited access to deposit and credit facilities and other financial services provided by formal 
financial institutions. For example, only about 5 percent of the population has access to the 
conventional banking industry. In many African countries the poor represent a “lion’s share” 
of the population hence the informal sector is an important part of the economy. To meet this 
demand for financial services, various types of MFIs have surfaced over time. Some MFIs 
focus on providing credit products, some focus on providing savings products and others 
provide both savings and credit facilities. In Ghana, the MFI sector has a strong orientation 
towards savings. Moreover, licensed institutions such as the Rural and Community Banks 
(RCBs), nonbank institutions,  and the Savings and Loans Companies (S&Ls), play a more 
prominent role than NGOs and account for most of the microfinance activities in the country 
(Basu et al., 2004). 
 
It is no surprise that these MFIs would be able to set up a sustainable business model, since 
the commercial banking system, which is dominated by a few major banks (among the 17 in 
total), only reaches approximately 5% of households. Moreover, most of these households are 
excluded by the large minimum deposit requirements imposed by the banks. It has been 
reported that 60% of the money supply falls outside the commercial banking system, hence 
the rural banks, savings and loans companies, and the semi-formal and informal financial 
sectors play a significantly important role in Ghana’s private sector development and poverty 
reduction strategies (Steel and Andah, 2003). 
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There were 115 RCBs operating in Ghana at the end of 2001, however these are very small in 
terms of loan size. But at the same time they have a large number of depositors (1.2 million) 
compared to borrowers (150 000). And there were eight S&Ls in the non-bank sector, with 
160 000 depositors and 10 000 borrowers by 2002, according to Basu et al. (2004). The 
RCBs are owned by members of the community through the purchase of shares and comprise 
of a major share of the microfinance services. Second to the RCBs, in terms of supplying 
MFI services, are the Savings and Loans companies. Recently modern cooperative societies 
have sought to expand their services to non-members as well, to overcome resource 
constraints to their growth and sustainability.  
 
Furthermore, the MFIs in Ghana are constantly seeking new innovative approaches to 
progress towards sustainability. These new approaches include using group savings with 
credit schemes. These schemes involve group members depositing their pooled funds with 
the MFI and then using these pooled funds as security to access loans, which they would not 
otherwise qualify for individually. The group savings accounts coexist with the loan 
accounts, however the loan repayments are made individually but settled through the group 
account. Such a scheme creates a dual advantage for the MFI by minimising risk and basing 
the loan on a high security and using group solidarity to prevent defaults. Nsoatreman, 
Bosomtwe, and Lower Pra RCBs are some of the examples using this strategy in Ghana. 
Once individuals have established a sound credit history they may then apply for loans 
individually to the MFIs (Chord, 2000).  
 
The informal money-lending sector in Ghana has been a rich source of innovation for the 
formal MFIs. Some of the innovations have been adopted by the formal MFIs and have thus 
assisted in the development and growth of the industry as a whole. A good example of 
innovation has been the Ghana Susu system which has since been widely adopted. This 
system covers a wide range of activities such as individual savings collectors, rotating 
savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), and savings and credit “clubs” run by an operator 
(Steel and Andah, 2003).  Table 3 below shows the different types of Susu role players. 
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Table 3: Building on Informal Sector Savings and Credit Mechanisms: The Example of 
the Ghana Susu System 
 
Type of Susu 
Institution 
Description 
Susu collectors Offer a saving vehicle by collecting daily amounts voluntarily saved by their 
clients, which they return at the end of the month, minus one day’s amount as 
a commission. The susu collector function was expanded by licensed MFIs 
with “Mobile Banking” services working as a collector going locally to 
mobilise savings and offering additional services, such as promised loans 
(proposed for example by Nsoetreman Rural Bank and First Allied S&L), and 
life insurance benefits (introduced briefly by the State Insurance Corporation 
in the 1980s). 
Susu associations Are either (i) rotating (ROSCAs), that is, they collect savings from their 
members and allocate them to each member in turn, or (ii) accumulating, 
which allow regular contributions to be accumulated, to cover the lump sum 
costs of such special future events as funerals. 
Susu clubs Combined the above two systems, operated by a single agent. Members 
commit to save a pre-defined amount over the medium-term (50- to 100-week 
cycles) and pay commissions on each payment and fees when they are 
advanced the targeted amount before the end of the cycle. 
Susu companies Are more recent (late 1980s) and registered. In addition to savings collected 
using traditional susu collectors, they provide loans after a minimum saving 
period. 
Source: Basu et al. (2004) 
 
According to Basu et al. (2004) the MFIs have used Susu associations, clubs, and companies 
to expand their services. In these schemes, Susu club operators are clients of licensed 
financial institutions. The club operators are attracted by the safe instruments where they can 
place the mobilised savings. In addition, they are interested in the lending facilities that they 
can use to provide more advances to their own clients. The licensed MFIs, on the other hand, 
may leverage on local informal agents’ in-depth knowledge of their clients. The RCBs and 
S&Ls have initiated a pilot project which provides funds to Susu collectors who then on-lend 
to their own-clients. These combined initiatives have resulted in cost synergies which 
effectively allow the MFIs to increase their outreach to lower income segments and women in 
general. 
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In addition, some commercial banks, insurance companies, RCBs, S&Ls, and credit unions 
have developed a savings product named “Susu,” including hiring people to gather the 
savings in the same way as a Susu collector. The State Insurance Corporation was the first 
financial institution to introduce such a “Money Back” savings plan in the 1980s, comprising 
a life insurance benefit for clients as an additional incentive to get savings, however due to a 
low uptake, the scheme was discontinued in 1999 (Steel and Andah, 2003). 
 
There are several challenges which the industry still faces including finding, selecting and 
training good staff and monitoring their progress in the field. Creating sustainable 
methodologies, financial products and services that resonate with the targeted vulnerable and 
marginalised market is an on-going battle that requires continuous research and development 
and support from donors. Funding for this sector comes from three sources: the institutions 
themselves, government and development partners. However, it has been discovered that the 
funds do not seem to be adequate to meet demand and the varying sources come with onerous 
conditions, distorting the market in some cases. There is also currently no microfinance fund 
to which MFIs can apply for on-lending and capacity building support.  Moreover, there is no 
national governing body which is given the responsibility for coordinating all activities 
associated with the microfinance industry. Consequently, the sector lacks a coherent 
approach, which results in fragmentation, duplication and inadequate collaboration between 
and among MFIs, development partners, service providers, practitioners and end users 
(Opare-Djan and Apania, 2008).  
 
Although there are many challenges that still face the microfinance industry in Ghana, the 
country provides key lessons in that formal MFIs and commercial banks, in other developing 
economies, can learn a great deal from the informal sector which will allow them to tailor-
make solutions to expand their services in this sector. The key here would be for the 
managers that operate in these formal institutions to open their minds and be willing to study 
the current business best-practices that are being used to provide credit by the informal 
players in this market. 
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CHAPTER 3: PREVAILING SMME FINANCING MODELS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
3.1 Historical development of the microfinance sector 
The modern South African microfinance industry began in the 1980s and its growth was 
spearheaded by a number of role players with different objectives. These role players 
included NGOs, for-profit organisations and government agencies. Porteus (2003) suggests 
that the growth of the microfinance market can be categorised into four distinct phases, 
namely: Pioneer, Break-out, Consolidation and Maturity.  It should be noted that these phases 
do not take into account the informal lenders who have been around even before the 1980s 
and operate mainly in the townships in South Africa.  
 
The Pioneer phase (from 1980 to 1994) comprised of NGOs and commercial lenders who 
developed microfinance products and gained initial success. These lenders operated illegally 
and charged excessive interest rates. The Breakout phase (from 1995 to 1999) comprised of 
rapid growth of the industry spurred by the exemption in 1992 to the Usury Act of 1968 that 
removed interest rate caps on short-term loans. This move effectively legalised the 
microfinance sector and as a result large capital flows were attracted from the legal financial 
sector. The Consolidation phase (from 2000 onwards) consisted of stiff competition among 
MFIs due to the rapid growth of the sector and this led to lower profit margins and increased 
risk to the MFIs. In addition, the government established the Micro Finance Regulatory 
Council (MFRC) and outlawed payroll lending which was used by MFIs as a collection 
mechanism. 
 
As a result, the lower profit margins, increased compliance and loss of a stable collection 
method led to many MFIs going bankrupt. According to an analysis conducted by Porteus 
(2003), there were 3500 formal MFIs in 1997, an increase of 192% over 1995. But this 
number was drastically reduced to 1334 formal MFIs in 2000 due to the stiff competition and 
the other factors mentioned above.  
 
The Maturity phase is characterised by the National Credit Act of 2007 which removed the 
cap on loan size (previously R10 000) and the establishment of the National Credit Regulator 
(NCR) which replaced the MFRC. The NCR is focusing on increasing access to microfinance 
for the low end of the market.  Since then, the rate of microloans issued has increased at a 
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lower rate, but it continues to increase nonetheless. This phase will be codified once the 
microfinance industry reaches a long-term sustainable growth rate and a consistent regulatory 
framework is implemented and adopted by all market participants. The microlending book in 
South Africa grew from about R17 billion in May 2004 to aboutR30 billion in May 2007 
(Skowronski, 2009).  
 
3.2 Supply of financial services to low-income households in South Africa  
The South African industry consists of both formal and informal financial service providers. 
The major distinction between the two is that the formal providers are industry players who 
mainly abide by the law and regulatory requirements. On the other hand, the informal 
industry players are those that do not adhere to any regulatory requirements but only abide by 
the ”laws of the jungle”. That is to say, they provide whatever the market wants and if the 
product does not gain traction in the market they abandon it. Examples of formal financial 
products include bank accounts, credit cards, savings accounts and insurance products. And 
examples of informal financial products include stokvels (savings clubs), burial societies and 
loans from mashonisas (loan-sharks).  
 
According to a report published by the Southern Africa Regional Poverty Network (2005), 13 
million out of 27 million South African adults (48%) did not have formal banking accounts. 
Moreover, of the unemployed, 83% did not have a bank account and 60% of those that 
worked in the informal sector did not have a bank account (unbanked). Research shows that 
low income households spend a lot of time and resources in maintaining their finances across 
several informal and formal systems. South African low income households use 11 different 
credit instruments, 4 different savings products and 2 insurance instruments, and of these 
products, 70% come from informal providers and 30% from formal providers (Collins and 
Morduch, 2008).  
 
Evidently, low-income households in South Africa demand and use a combination of 
financial products across the financial spectrum of services comprising of credit, savings, 
insurance and transactional offerings. However, accessing these products from the formal 
sector is still a major challenge for low-income households. The demand and supply of 
financial services can be thought of as a pyramid structure as shown by the figure below 
(Southern Africa Regional Poverty Network, 2005).  
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Figure 1: Market segmentation of financial services in South Africa 
 
Source: Southern Africa Regional Poverty Network (2005) 
 
The pyramid market segmentation above consists of two levels: the first economy and the 
second economy. The first economy which is at the top of the pyramid comprises of the 
financial needs of the middle class which are serviced by the big four banks (ABSA, FNB, 
Nedbank and Standard Bank). These providers supply a wide range of sophisticated financial 
products such as insurance, investments, savings, transactional accounts and other facilities. 
The salaried working class and those that are able to earn a regular income from self-
employment are also able to access the big four banks although to a lesser extent. Moreover, 
they are able to source products from commercial microlenders, government agencies and 
credit unions. At the bottom of the pyramid exists the second economy which consists of 
microenterprises (economically active poor), survivalist enterprises (very poor) and the 
destitute (hard core poor). A huge gap exists in terms of financial services in the bottom half 
of the pyramid. There are few financial institutions that play in this market; these are 
primarily NGOs (developmental microfinance organisations) who provide limited access to 
loans for enterprise development, but few offer insurance and savings products.  
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3.3 Challenges facing the microfinance industry  
There are many challenges that the microfinance industry faces in South Africa. The 
obstacles and some of the external variables that have been cited in several studies as an 
impediment to the growth of the industry are: (1) economic dualism; (2) formal competition; 
(3) informal competition; (4) higher loan sizes; (5) banking fees; (6) cost of regulation; (7) 
limited entrepreneurial training; and (8) urbanisation and immigration. These barriers are 
briefly discussed below (Skowronski, 2009):  
 
• Economic dualism: South African MFIs pay first economy type salaries but earn revenues 
from the second economy. As a result of the cost-to-loan size mismatch MFIs in South 
Africa incur a high salary burden.  
• Formal competition: South African MFIs face stiff competition from well funded and 
widely distributed commercial banks for borrowers with a good credit record. 
• Informal competition: some borrowers are still skeptical of MFIs and thus rely on 
mashonisas and stokvels to access credit facilities even though the MFIs might have 
advantageous loan terms. 
• Higher loan sizes: on average MFIs in South Africa have to offer higher loan sizes than in 
other emerging markets due to higher demands of borrowers. As a result MFIs are unable 
to diversify risk from their loan portfolio by borrowing to more clients compared to their 
counterparts in other emerging markets. 
• Banking fees: South African commercial banks charge high fixed banking fees rather a 
fixed percentage to accept deposits and this has a negative impact on profitability for 
MFIs that deposit large volumes of small loan repayments. 
• Cost of regulation: South Africa has a first-world regulatory environment which imposes 
onerous compliance costs on MFIs that are higher than their counterparts in other 
emerging markets that have less formal government agencies. 
• Limited entrepreneurial training: during the apartheid era small black enterprises were 
prohibited to ensure that there was cheap labour for large enterprises. As a result, 
emerging entrepreneurs lack role models from whom they can learn the relevant and 
necessary business skills. 
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• Urbanisation and immigration: large cities have a transient population which lacks long-
term relationships as a result of urbanisation, consequently it is difficult for MFIs to offer 
solidarity based loans. However, to a certain extent, this is mitigated in the townships and 
probably in the rural areas. 
 
3.4 Programmes targeted at providing finance for Small Medium and Micro 
Enterprises (SMMEs)  
There are many different programmes that are aimed at providing finance to the SMME 
sector in South Africa. These programmes can be broadly grouped into three categories: (1) 
State initiated institutions involved in SMME financing; (2) Private sector programmes for 
SMME finance; and (3) Non-commercial or community-based financiers of SMMEs.  State 
initiated institutions were set up by government with the aim of providing and increasing 
access to financial services for SMMEs. Private sector programmes include the banking 
sector, commercial microlenders, insurance products and venture capital and equity funds. 
The non-commercial financiers comprise of the non-profit microfinance sector and village 
banking model which target SMMEs.  
 
3.4.1 State initiated institutions involved in SMME financing 
There are numerous state initiated programmes that exist and each one of these is covered 
briefly below, highlighting their focus of providing SMME funding. However, Khula is the 
most prominent of these programmes in terms of its focus on the lower end of the SMME 
sector, thus a detailed analysis of the products and services it offers is outlined.  
 
(a) Khula Enterprise Finance Limited (Khula) 
Khula was set up as a wholesaler with the objective of creating and developing SMMEs by 
providing loans particularly to previously disadvantaged individuals. It was established by the 
Department of National Treasury in 1996 with a grant of R162 million and operates as a 
private company with government as the only shareholder. Khula’s main strategy is to fulfill 
its mandate by leveraging Retail Funding Intermediaries (RFIs) and providing guarantees to 
commercial banks.  The products and services that are offered by Khula to SMMEs are 
briefly outlined below (Khula, 2003 and Motsa, 2004). 
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(i) Khula Loans 
Debt financing, seed loans and capacity building to RFIs are some of the offerings provided 
by Khula Loans. The sizes of loans to RFIs range from R10 000 to R2million. In 2001, the 
average loan size for all RFIs was R 29 323. Business loans to RFIs are usually made at an 
interest rate lower than the prime lending rate of banks and these are meant to be on-lended to 
SMMEs. In addition, seed loans which are non-interest bearing are supplied for covering the 
operational shortfall of start-up RFIs. Furthermore, capacity building to assist with training 
and management systems is also provided for start-up RFIs. 
 
(ii) Khula Start 
Khula Start is an entry-level product aimed at the microbusiness sector. The product utilises 
the group-lending model to groups of rural women who own micro enterprises. The loans 
which range from R300 to R3500 are made available through intermediary organisations 
called Micro Credit Organisations (MCOs). Khula Start loans are largely made to first-time 
borrowers who need micro loans to provide for their families through micro economic 
activities. 
 
(iii) Private Equity Funds 
In addition, Khula provides financing for private equity funds that cover transaction values 
ranging between R250 000 and R5 million. As a result of this product, in 2003 the Anglo-
Khula Mining Fund, a joint venture between Anglo American and Khula, was launched to 
assist emerging miners (Khula, 2003). 
 
(iv) Credit Guarantee Scheme 
The scheme was set up to provide access to finance to SMMEs who want to start or expand 
their businesses but lack sufficient security to act as collateral as required by the major banks. 
The participating banks through which SMMEs can access the scheme are ABSA, First 
National Bank, Nedbank and Standard Bank. The scheme covers loans between R10 000 and 
R3 million.   
 
(V) Thuso Mentorship Programme 
The mentorship programme provides pre-loan and post-loan support to SMMEs who apply 
for commercial bank loans. The pre-loan support covers business plan development and 
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advisory services whereas post-loan assistance includes rescue services and mentoring 
support. The scheme was established to encourage commercial banks to use the Khula Credit 
Guarantee Scheme. Subsequently, in 2001, the programme was extended to include other 
RFIs. 
 
Throughout its existence Khula has faced many challenges and criticism one of them being a 
disappointing uptake of the guarantee scheme by banks. Foxtrott et al. (2002), in their 2002 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor report found that the scheme was a good idea in principle, 
however it was poorly implemented and marketed. Moreover, it has been discovered that 
Khula’s portfolio guarantees have not been able to provide additional credit supplied on less 
demanding terms. Furthermore, the funds have failed to generate large enough volumes to 
achieve economies of scale and thus reduce unit costs to profitable levels (Schoombee, 2000).  
 
The wholesale model used by Khula has also been raised as an issue in that the retailing 
banking institutions which Khula uses have been designed to serve only the high end of the 
overall market. Furthermore, because the banking sector and its practices were not 
comprehensively focused on SMME financing, the number of banks was still far from being 
able to adequately service SMMEs. Khula management has continued to consider the 
possibility of employing a retail model in order to be able to directly service its primary target 
market (SMMEs). However the debate continues and the decision has not been finalised, and 
this further adds to the detriment of SMMEs (Motsa, 2004). 
 
Another challenge is that a lot of RFIs faced problems with institutional capacity. Due to poor 
governance, inefficient management systems, fraud and mismanagement, many RFIs 
collapsed in 2000. However, steps were taken to ensure that RFIs remain sustainable and 
these changes included improving governance, the appointment of specialist risk managers, 
regular audits of RFIs and employing stricter financial management control systems. Due to 
these improvements, further collapses were prevented. As a result, Marang Financial Services 
one of Khula’s best performing and largest RFIs with over 20,000 clients continues to thrive 
(Motsa, 2004). 
 
Marang Financial Services emerged from the collapse of the Get Ahead Foundation (GAF) 
and Rural Finance Facility (RFF) in 2000 and was built upon the experience and institutional 
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memory of the two organisations. The organisation currently operates in five provinces 
(Mpumalanga, Limpopo, KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng and Eastern Cape) with 23 branches and 
19 satellite offices, and its clients are mainly women. Marang provides group enterprise loans 
by employing the solidarity lending model to groups of women between five and eight, and 
between ages 18 and 70 years. These are women who are not able to get loans from the 
formal sector due to not having collateral. Marang is also considering individual loans and 
microinsurance products to men and women (over 21 years of age) who have been operating 
their businesses for at least two years (Skowronski, 2009).   
 
(b) Other state initiated programmes  
There are several other state initiated programmes aimed at supplying financial services to 
SMMEs and these are briefly outlined below. 
 
(i) National Empowerment Fund (NEF) 
Established in 1998, the NEF’s major objective is to promote economic participation of 
historically disadvantaged persons and to facilitate black economic empowerment through 
finance and investment activities. The NEF has three main offerings:  private equity (for 
transactions between R25 –R200 million); venture capital (for seed and acquisition capital) 
and investment services (for designing and packaging of mass empowerment share-buying 
schemes). NEF plays a role in financing the upper end of the market for SMME and it has 
been widely criticised as slow to take off and as another “white elephant setup to benefit a 
few chosen blacks” (Wadula, 2003).  
 
(ii) Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) 
The IDC offers a wide range of products which are aimed at the high-end of the market 
requiring a minimum of R1million in funding. Recently the IDC has facilitated black 
empowerment transactions for emerging black businessmen wanting to acquire a stake in 
established formal South African businesses.  
 
(iii) Land Bank 
The Land Bank has a focus on providing finance to agricultural entrepreneurs from start-ups 
to established commercial farmers. The Land Bank also promotes black economic 
empowerment initiatives within the agricultural sector. Microfinance loans are also provided 
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to poor individuals and farmers which range from R250 to R18 000. No security is required 
for these loans but borrowers need to have a bank account and a fixed interest rate of about 
2% is levied. This microfinance initiative called Step-Up was established in 1998 by the Land 
Bank. However the impact of the Step-Up scheme in the market has not been widely studied 
and documented as yet (Sukazi, 2003).  
 
(iv) Post Bank 
Post Bank offers savings facilities to the low end of the market through its widespread post 
office network distributed throughout the country. It has also been reported that the Post 
Bank and government are considering expanding the range of products that the institution 
offers to include other financial services such as insurance (Motsa, 2004). 
 
(v) Business Partners 
Business Partners is a specialist investment organisation and was established as the Small 
Business Development Corporation in 1981 and re-launched as Business Partners in 1998, 
after a change in strategic direction. It focuses on investments between R250 000 and R7 
million. These investments are structured using equity, shareholders’ loan accounts, royalties 
and term loans or any combination of these. Its focus is mainly on the upper end of the 
SMME finance market. 
 
(vi) Umsobomvu Youth Fund (UYF) 
The UYF was established in 2001 to facilitate job creation and skills development of the 
South African youth, the UYF provides business advisory services and finance through its 
voucher scheme and various business partnerships. Funding varies from microfinance to 
equity finance of up to R5 million. However, according to Motsa (2004), the potential impact 
and relevance of the fund in the microfinance market and on youth development has not been 
widely documented. In 2009, the National Youth Development Agency (NYDA) was formed 
as a result of a merger between the UYF and the National Youth Commission (NYC). The 
move created a single, consolidated structure that is responsible for all aspects of youth 
development in South Africa. 
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3.4.2 Private sector programmes for SMME finance 
As previously noted, private sector programmes consist of the banking sector, commercial 
microlenders, insurance products and venture capital and equity funds. According to the 2001 
GEM report (Driver et al., 2001) commercial banks are not optimally configured to financing 
SMMEs and this is largely due to that they developed in an economy dominated by large 
enterprises. Consequently commercial banks lack the set of skills necessary for assessing and 
mentoring start-ups and small enterprises. As a result their assessment and decision making, 
and consequently their products are not tailored to the specific needs of entrepreneurs. 
Alternatively, commercial microlenders, distinct from microfinance for enterprise 
development, have long been considered in a negative light - as it is seen to be a consumer 
credit driven sector - by those seeking to provide microfinance for SMME development. 
Commercial microlenders have only been interested in providing consumer loans to salaried 
workers with no real interest in social development (Motsa, 2004). 
 
On the other hand, the insurance industry has not been under as much pressure as the banking 
industry to provide services to the SMME sector. With the spread of HIV/AIDS and the risks 
posed to SMMEs, this is going to become a major priority. Moreover, due to the informal 
nature of most of the insurance organisations that operate in this sector, products often 
overlap, crossing the distinction between insurance, savings and credit (Bester etc al 2003). 
These institutions are mostly burial societies and have an estimated 8 million members which 
contribute in excess of R10 billion each year. Research has found that most of these 
organisations operate with a connection to an insurance company. Hence, the formal 
insurance industry also has a potential role to play in the provision of credit and other 
financial services to the SMME sector (Bester et al, 2003). 
 
Research conducted on the South African venture capital industry found that South Africa 
has a developed venture capital market, however  very few organisations focus on small and 
microbusinesses (ECI, 2001). The study also highlighted the fact that the lack of management 
skills is likely to limit small and microbusinesses and entrepreneurs from accessing the 
potentially beneficial resources provided by the venture capital industry.  
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3.4.3 Non-commercial or community-based financiers of SMMEs 
As indicated before, non-commercial financiers comprise of the non-profit microfinance 
sector and village banking model which target SMMEs. Among the MFIs which play a 
significant role in South Africa, the Small Enterprise Foundation (SEF) is one of the oldest 
MFIs and has been active since 1992. Its target market is largely residents based in the rural 
areas of South Africa, mainly Limpopo and Mpumalanga, where poverty is widespread. SEF 
has about 58,000 clients and an outstanding loan portfolio of R89 million with an average 
loan of about R2000 per client (2009 figures).  
 
The MFI provides two products: the Microcredit Programme (MCP) which specifically 
targets poor women and the Tshomisano Credit Programme (TCP). Both programmes employ 
the Grameen model of providing loans to solidarity groups of five members. Members are 
required to save (R10 minimum) at every biweekly meeting and savings are held at Post 
Bank branches. The model uses loan officers who are active in collecting information about 
each member’s savings records and food consumption. Quarterly reports are documented 
which allow the loan officer and client to build an in-depth relationship regarding financial 
services (Skowronski, 2009). 
 
The village banking model exists as a potential vehicle to supplement existing microfinance 
initiatives for microenterprise and local economic development. However, it has had a 
somewhat difficult existence in South Africa, due largely to two factors: (1) the issue of an 
unclear regulation and (2) a lack of financial support for the establishment of “umbrella” 
bodies. Nonetheless, the potential role that village banks can play with respect to the use and 
up-take of loan products tailored specifically for SMMEs needs to be investigated, as it has 
not yet been well researched and documented (Motsa, 2004). 
 
Evidently, there are several business best-practices that can be adopted from other developing 
economies and then adapted and applied within the South African context. Having taken into 
account the prevailing models that are used in South Africa, the next section of this paper 
explores the designing of a possible financing model that would be suitable for use in South 
Africa targeted specifically at microbusinesses.  
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CHAPTER 4: PROPOSED FINANCING MODEL FOR MICROBUSINESSES IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
A recent paper by Ojah and Mokoteli (2010) briefly assessed the relevance and potential of 
using leasing as a financing tool for microbusinesses in South Africa. The paper suggested 
that improved use of leasing could be a possible beneficial financing model, because this 
model would overcome some of the existing constraints in providing credit to the poor. In a 
leasing contract, the asset which is leased remains the property of the lessor (seller) for the 
period of the lease and thus serves as a contract enforcement mechanism. In developing 
economies where microbusinesses lack the necessary collateral to access credit this form of 
contract addresses the collateral requirements of most financial institutions (Ojah and 
Mokoteli, 2010). Hence this arrangement would improve the chances of microbusinesses 
accessing credit. 
 
This section of the paper explores in further detail the case for using leasing as a financing 
model for microbusinesses in South Africa – microleasing. Therefore, the features, 
advantages and challenges of microleasing are presented in detail to make the case for 
microleasing. 
 
4.2 Microleasing as a suitable financing model  
Leases are long-term rental-type contractual arrangements: in this case a provider (lessor) 
allows a user (lessee) to use an asset for an agreed-upon time in exchange for predefined 
payments. There are two main types that differ significantly: financial leases and operating 
leases. In a financial lease agreement, the lease amortises most of the cost of the asset and at 
the end of the lease period the lessee has the option to purchase the asset for a nominal price. 
In general, a lease agreement cannot be cancelled, and the associated maintenance and 
insurance costs are the responsibility of the lessee. Almost all the risks associated with 
owning the asset are transferred to the lessee without actually transferring the ownership title. 
However, in an operating lease agreement: the lease amortises only part of the asset cost; 
there is no option to buy the asset; operating leases can be cancelled for a fee; and 
maintenance and insurance costs lie with the lessor (Nair and Kloeppinger-Todd, 2006).  
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In the context of this paper, microleasing takes the form
serves as an alternative to loans as an effective means of fin
Furthermore, microleasing is a means to acquire assets to start 
opposed to renting the assets. 
henceforth in the sections that follow
 
4.2.1 Processes  
The microleasing process from application to equipment transfer can be completed quickly 
possibly within approximately two weeks. The steps involved are depicted in figure 2 below.
 
Figure 2: High-level microleasing process
 
The process starts with a loan officer assisting the applicant to complete a simple application 
form. The loan officer then verifies the application form with supporting documents such as 
proof of residence and national identity document
appraisal by the loan officer and a secondary appraisal by the branch manager. Additional 
documents from the lessee include copies of incorporation of the entity and 
statements (if available), this depends on the nature of the m
or established business. The client is also expected to supply at least three quotes of the 
equipment to be purchased. 
borrower’s prior income, assessing the risk in
visit the borrower’s house or potential business premise.
business will be assessed to calculate the appropriate payment terms and period (Dowla, 1998 
and Gallardo, 1997). 
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The final step includes various activities such as signing of the microleasing contract and the 
purchasing of the equipment. In this case the MFI (lessor) pays the equipment supplier 
directly. To obtain competitive prices the MFI can build a relationship with several major 
suppliers of popular equipment used by microbusinesses depending on the particular market. 
Furthermore, clients that establish a good credit record with the MFI can be able to get 
multiple microleasing contracts, as long as they are viable (Nair and Kloeppinger-Todd, 
2006). 
 
The process outlined above shows a situation where the MFI is approached by a client. 
Conversely, the loan officers of the MFI can scout the community for potential microleasing 
candidates. In this instance, the loan officer identifies a potential client and then follows the 
same procedure as depicted in figure 2.  
 
4.2.2 Key features  
There are several characteristics of microleasing that are imperative to make the model work 
especially in the context of developing economies. To make this model practical, the 
following features listed below are required (Havers, 1999; Dowla, 1998 and Nair and 
Kloeppinger-Todd, 2006). 
 
(a) Collateral: The asset is used as primary security. Depending on the risk of the client an 
additional 10-20% of the cost of asset is requested as a deposit in order to issue the 
microlease. This deposit is then deducted from the residual cost of the asset at the end of 
the microlease. 
(b) Insurance: The microlease is covered by insurance on the life of the client and another 
insurance to cover all risks (fire, theft etc) on each asset. Additionally, residual value 
insurance is taken to cover the instance were a repossessed asset is worth less than the 
balance due on the microlease. All the insurance costs are included in the microlease 
weekly or monthly payment (rental). 
(c) Period of microlease: The microlease period can range from anywhere between 6 to 24 
months depending on the nature of the microbusiness and affordability of the client. 
(d) Cost of microlease: The microlease rental is loaded with costs such as the cost of the 
equipment, operating costs, loss provision, insurance costs and profit margin.  
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(e) Payment schedule: The microlease payment can be made weekly or monthly depending 
on the length of the microlease. For shorter and riskier clients, weekly payments would be 
more appropriate to monitor the client more closely. 
(f) Option to buy equipment: The client has the option to buy the equipment at the end of the 
microlease. If there was a deposit made the residual costs would be offset against the 
deposit. 
(g) Used equipment: Microbusinesses tend to use secondhand machines hence it would be 
unduly restrictive for MFIs to only fund new equipment. However this practice requires a 
robust secondhand market and reputable independent valuators to determine accurate 
resale values. 
(h) Appraisals: The MFI is required to have a robust method of determining the ability of the 
leased asset to generate the required cashflow that will cover the microlease periodic 
payments.  
(i) Buying of the asset: The MFI pays the equipment supplier directly and the money never 
actually passes through the microbusiness. 
 
4.3 Advantages of microleasing 
Microleasing is a close substitute for loans as a financing tool for business assets. For MFIs 
that provide microleasing, microleasing offers several advantages compared to loans. These 
advantages are derived from the difference of the two methods as well as the legal 
requirements that govern the two types of financing tools. According to Nair and 
Kloeppinger-Todd (2006) transaction costs of microleasing are typically lower than those of 
loans, because the cost associated with securing collateral and the cost of foreclosure, in the 
instance of default, are avoided. Furthermore, taking possession of loan collateral is more 
difficult than repossessing leased assets. The latter situation does not normally require the use 
of the court system, whereas the former does. Moreover, MFIs that offer leasing are not 
subject to the same arduous regulatory framework as banks. Consequently they bear less 
costly regulatory requirements. 
 
Gallardo (1997) identifies several advantages that accrue to the microbusiness (lessee) and 
those that accrue to the MFI (lessor). Advantages to microbusinesses (lessees) are: 
• Microleasing can fill the gap left by banks in terms of financing microbusinesses in many 
developing economies. 
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• Less stringent and simpler collateral arrangements means more microbusinesses can 
access credit more easily than bank loans. 
• Microleasing contracts can be easily configured to match the cashflow requirements of 
the microbusiness. 
• Microbusinesses can gain tax benefits by offsetting their full microlease payment against 
profit before tax, compared to the depreciation allowance or interest charges on bank 
loans. Although this might be more applicable and relevant in more developed economies 
with advanced tax regimes (Havers, 1999). 
• No requirement to attend mandatory group-lending meetings required by MFIs which are 
time-consuming and onerous (Havers, 1999).  
 
The advantages that microleasing offers to MFIs (lessors) includes the following: 
• Since the MFI buys the asset directly it reduces the chance of the borrowed funds being 
used for other means rather than for the starting or growing the business. 
• Simpler documentation and quicker processes associated with microleasing means better 
cost control and MFIs can grow their organisations quickly. 
• Less stringent regulatory requirements in the case where the MFI does not take any 
deposits from the clients. 
• The MFI has a stronger collateral position since the asset belongs to the MFI until the 
obligations of the microleasing agreement have been fully met by the client. 
• As the owner of the asset the MFI can get the tax benefit offered by the depreciation 
expense, as a shield against taxes on income gained from the microleasing agreement. 
 
4.4 Challenges facing the microleasing model 
Despite the numerous advantages that the microleasing model guarantees, there are several 
constraints that the model faces. Dowla (1998) mentions that the Grameen bank experience 
has largely been positive regarding its microleasing programme, however it faces certain 
problems. These problems originate from the failure of bank staff to enforce the rules 
mandated by the bank. These problems include transportation equipment being involved in 
accidents where the insurance claims cannot be processed due to vehicles lacking the 
necessary documentation. In some instances, prior to the lease expiring, the leased asset was 
sold fraudulently by the client to raise more funds without the MFI’s permission. Moreover, 
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there are situations where the MFI was unable to repossess the leased asset. However, all 
these challenges are manageable and can be addressed with the proper training of staff and 
appropriate legal framework in place to facilitate repossessions for lease-type agreements. 
 
Another challenge is due to the fact that microleasing is primarily used to finance the 
purchasing of an asset and not for financing working capital. Not all businesses require 
finance to buy equipment, some may require finance to buy stock. In this scenario, the MFI 
may use the “sale and leaseback” technique, where the microbusiness sells an asset (that they 
already own) to the MFI. The MFI then leases the asset back to the microbusiness, thus 
releasing the required funds for working capital. Nonetheless, in practice, research has shown 
the “sale and leaseback” method requires strict control measures and the client must have a 
sound business or proposal for it to work effectively (Havers, 1999). 
 
4.5 Suggested strategies for success 
A study conducted by Nichter et al. (2002) found that there are a number of key factors that 
are required for an MFI to succeed, some of which are relevant to MFIs offering 
microleasing. These factors are based on the premise that MFIs that adopt appropriate 
strategies can overcome obstacles facing microfinance, in general, thereby improving the 
performance and growth of the MFI.  These strategies are as follows:  
 
• Focus on lower-income SMMEs: In many developing economies this segment forms a 
large share of the microfinance market. By focusing on this market, it reduces 
competition from substitute credit products. Guarantee requirements force many 
institutions not to play in this market segment. 
• Develop specific products relevant to the needs of the client: MFIs should understand the 
specific needs of the customers and then innovate to provide credit products that will 
solve the client’s problems. Currently, MFIs offer vanilla credit products that may at 
times not fit the cashflow or income patterns of the client. 
• Promote an understanding of the products to the target market through effective 
marketing: MFIs should use messages and media channels that will increase awareness of 
the credit products that they offer. In marketing campaigns, MFIs should emphasise how 
a product specifically meets the needs of the client. Moreover, the Media channels used 
should be relevant and resonate with their target market (microbusinesses). 
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• Explore alternative effective distribution channels: Using alternative distributions that do 
not rely on loan officers could allow MFIs to offer new products and increase their 
outreach. Possible solutions would include partnering with the retail industry or the 
widespread postal office network and other government institutions. 
 
On the other hand, Havers (1999) and Johnson et al., (2005) indicate that for an MFI to be 
successful it has to have the right balance and synergy in terms of professional skills. The 
management team has to complement each other with both financial management skills and 
social sciences’ skills. The notion of having the right skills set is the same reason given to the 
success of SKS Microfinance as mentioned by Akula (2008). In addition, Havers (1999) and 
Akula (2008) suggest that being a for-profit business also helps with the running of the 
microfinance in that clients and staff act professionally and take the business seriously. In this 
case, clients do not get the wrong impression that there is an unlimited source of funds from 
“some generous benefactor” who will allow them to avoid loan repayments.  
 
As stated previously, Akula (2008) found that for a business focusing on the bottom end of 
the pyramid it is imperative that its business model be scalable since profit margins are very 
low in this market. Scalability allows the business to grow very quickly and hence achieve 
the necessary volumes required to make the business sustainable. Microleasing as a business 
model is highly scalable. Havers (1999), notes that two characteristics make the model 
scalable, these are: (1) the clear rules and procedures inherent in microleasing make it easy to 
increase operations and hence distribution and (2) operational staff are not required to possess 
sophisticated technical skills and business decision-making. For these reasons, microleasing 
can borrow some of the entrepreneurial principles used by fast-scaling consumer businesses 
(McDonald’s and Starbucks) such as standardising products, systems, training and other 
processes to boost capacity and reduce unit costs. 
 
Furthermore, research conducted in Ghana found that the informal money-lending sector has 
been a rich source of innovation for formal MFIs, as earlier noted (Steel and Andah, 2003). In 
applying the microleasing model, this strategy used in Ghana suggests that the model when 
applied in South Africa should be adapted to the needs of the South African clients, by 
learning from the informal sector as well. That is to say, the current informal models in South 
Africa could have positive lessons for microleasing, and thus be a source of further 
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innovation. For example, the group-lending models currently used in most of the developing 
economies including South Africa, as seen above in some of the schemes, could be adopted 
for use in microleasing. Even though the model uses the leased-asset as security, group-
lending could reduce default and thus enhance the position of the MFI. 
 
Another effective strategy is the one that was used by Banco do Nordeste to start the 
CrediAmigo programme. The key feature of this strategy is that CrediAmigo was formed as 
an autonomous division within an established bank, and primarily focused on developing 
solutions tailored to the poor and SMMEs. In this case, as earlier stated, the programme 
benefited through economies of scale provided by its parent company (Schonberger, 2001). 
However the danger in this strategy is that the parent company management might interfere 
needlessly with the division, so it would be crucial that the division remain autonomous. 
Alternatively, in this instance, commercial banks may offer microleasing as a product through 
a wholly-owned subsidiary or a joint-venture (with other partners) that operates 
independently of the bank (Kotei, 2010). 
 
By using some of the strategies indicated above, such as focusing on innovative technology, 
effective marketing and simple and fast application processes, Capitec Bank has managed to 
serve profitably the low end of the market and provide a suite of financial services. Capitec 
Bank was established in South Africa in 2001 and has grown rapidly to 2.5 million clients as 
at 31 August 2010. The total value of loans advanced grew from R1, 477 millions in 2003 to 
R8, 645 millions in 2010 and the number of loans grew from 2, 454, 000 (2003) to 3, 861, 
000 (2010). In addition, headline earnings increased from R30 million to R437 million during 
the same period. The bank attributes its success to its unique technology driven, low cost, 
flexible and scalable business model (Capitec Audited Financial Results, 2010).  
Even though the bank focuses on salaried individuals it still serves as an example to refute the 
notion by the big four banks (Absa, FNB, Standard Bank and Nedbank) in South Africa that 
the low end of the mainstream market cannot be served profitably and sustainably (Motsa, 
2004 and Driver et al., 2001). 
 
4.6 The role of government, donors and the private sector 
Microleasing plays an important role in bringing microbusinesses into the formal financial 
system. Once microbusinesses have access to microleasing they start building a financial 
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transactional history which can later be accessed by formal institutions such as banks. Hence 
microbusinesses are then able to join the formal sector as they would already have an 
accessible credit history. Consequently, developing the microleasing sector provides a route 
for accessing finance for microbusinesses that are currently marginalised by the formal 
financial system, thus enhancing production, economic growth and job creation in developing 
economies (Kotei, 2010). 
 
Moreover, microleasing can be a profitable financing model, however jump-starting it will 
require support from the government, donor organisations and the private sector. Studies 
conducted on companies offering microleasing in Uganda, Pakistan and Mexico found that 
even though these companies were all profitable, they benefitted substantially from access to 
government and donor funds (Nair and Kloeppinger-Todd, 2006).  
 
In order to realise the economic advantages that microleasing may present to 
microbusinesses, a sound legal framework which provides clarity on leasing and ownership 
of assets is a pre-requisite. Furthermore, a favourable regulatory environment on MFIs that 
offer microleasing is also important, in that these institutions should not be subject to onerous 
regulation which is usually required of deposit taking institutions. The government and donor 
agencies can also provide wholesale funds in generous terms and conditions, especially in the 
early stages of this nascent financing model, in order to boost its development and 
sustainability. The private sector also has an important role to play. Leasing companies may 
provide technical expertise and capacity building skills to the MFIs that intend to offer 
microleasing. In addition, current MFIs may expand their services and offer microleasing, 
especially to clients who have graduated from a group-lending scheme (Havers, 1999). 
 
Gallardo (1997) emphasises that the countries that have been successful in developing 
microleasing (e.g. Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Phillipines) had relatively stable 
macroeconomic conditions such as income growth, interest rates and foreign exchange rates. 
In addition, regulations regarding supervision and tax structures governing microleasing were 
clearly defined and formalised. Without a clear regulatory framework and support from 
government and the private sector, it would be difficult for microleasing to succeed and be 
sustainable, and thus help the poor access the much-needed capital for their microbusinesses. 
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4.7 Microleasing examples in other developing economies 
Even though microleasing may face a number of challenges that serve as obstacles for its 
development, there are some success stories of organisations that have adopted the financing 
model and experienced positive results. Nair and Kloeppinger-Todd (2006), studied three 
commercial providers in Uganda, Pakistan and Mexico that have found success with 
microleasing as a viable financing model. These companies primarily serve clients in major 
rural segments in these countries. The companies in Uganda (Development Finance Company 
Uganda) and Pakistan (Network Leasing Corporation Limited) focus on SMMEs, whilst the 
company in Mexico (Arrendadora John Deere) serves medium and large farming enterprises. 
All three companies were found to be profitable, with Development Finance Company 
Uganda (DFCU) and Network Leasing Corporation Limited (NLCL) being listed in their 
national stock exchanges.  
 
Nair and Kloeppinger-Todd (2006) discovered that the advantages of microleasing suggested 
in theory do actually work in practice. The companies reported that for their respective firms, 
they found transactional costs to be lower in microleasing than in lending, levels of defaults 
and write-offs were stated to be even lower. Furthermore, these companies were subject to 
fewer regulations compared to commercial banks as they were not registered as depository 
institutions. Consequently, they had lower costs related to regulatory compliance. In addition, 
the study found that the three companies reinforce the viability of microleasing as a feasible 
and sustainable financing tool for rural and urban environments. All three companies reported 
that their loans from rural clients performed as well as the loans from their urban clients. 
Furthermore, several clients had more than one microlease indicating that microleasing does 
have repeat borrowers which are critical for the success of any business. 
 
Another success story of microleasing comes from Uzbekistan (Kotei, 2010). Uzbek Leasing 
International (ULI) which focuses on SMMEs is one of the leading and most successful 
leasing companies in the country. In August 2008, the International Finance Corporation 
committed US$3 million as a loan to ULI targeted at addressing the scarcity of term foreign 
currency financing in Uzbekistan, which would subsequently help ULI expand its outreach in 
Uzbekistan. The IFC has helped the company by providing advisory services to further 
strengthen its operational capacity.  
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Furthermore, the IFC has played a significant role in developing the leasing in Uzbekistan by 
facilitating the amendment of relevant legislation. As a result of these interventions by the 
IFC the leasing sector grew by US$220 million between 2001 and 2007. In addition, several 
SMMEs have been able to implement their investment plans and modernise their businesses 
through microleasing. Previously, SMMEs could only access finance from the informal 
sector, infamous for having high interest rates and unfavourable loan terms. Overall, the 
microleasing sector in Uzbekistan has had a positive impact on employment in the country 
(Kotei, 2010). 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper has managed to establish convincingly that microleasing is a viable, sustainable 
and profitable model for financing microbusinesses in developing economies and particularly 
South Africa. The fact that it has not been explored sufficiently in South Africa remains a 
mystery and not enough studies have been conducted to determine why it has not been 
pursued by the commercial banks and other Developmental Financial Institutions (DFIs) and 
MFIs in South Africa. It can only be hypothesised that commercial banks have always taken a 
“tick the box” approach when it comes to offering financial services to the poor as they 
believe that this segment cannot be served profitably. Hence in their offerings banks have 
only focused on supplying vanilla credit products which require stringent unattainable assets 
as collateral and have not paid much attention to innovating for this segment. However, this 
study has presented the argument that in order to serve this segment profitably financial 
institutions require forward-thinking abilities and commercial astuteness.  
 
Nonetheless, it has been shown that SMMEs can gain substantially from microleasing as they 
do not have assets that could serve as collateral for loans or other types of secured credit. 
Developing microleasing enables these SMMEs to access funding to set up their 
microbusinesses, and consequently allow them to access income-generating assets. The 
impact of this on the economy of developing countries cannot be undermined. With this 
opportunity, SMMEs are incentivised to access finance for their businesses and thus promote 
domestic production, economic growth and the creation of employment for the unemployed.  
 
In addition, this paper has presented the numerous advantages that are offered by 
microleasing for both the MFIs (lessors) and the borrowers (lessees) over other types of 
lending including the fact that microleasing offers an enhanced form of collateral. This is a 
result of that the asset ownership of the leased-asset remains with the MFI until full payments 
have been made by the borrower, at which point the ownership of the asset passes to the 
borrower. In this case, repossessions are easy to execute by the MFI when the borrower is in 
default.  
 
It has also been shown that there are many key success factors that can be adopted from other 
developing economies. These can then be applied within the context of South Africa. The 
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different cases studied therein offer several key beneficial features such as the group-lending 
model, the importance of running an MFI professionally from inception, the use of simple 
technology to create simple and scalable processes, the significant role of the informal sector 
and the many lessons it entails and the emphasis on ensuring that the MFI is profit-oriented at 
all levels of the organisation. In addition, it is clear to see that within the MFI, standards of 
accountability, corporate governance and transparency need be world-class and of a high 
level. This has the added benefit of the MFI being able to easily attract much-needed capital 
from the private sector and international community. 
 
Furthermore, it was found that creating a sustainable microleasing industry in developing 
economies requires considerable investment and technical knowledge and skills provided to 
policy makers, regulators, donors and private-sector participants. Concerted efforts must also 
be made by the South African government to put in place requisite infrastructural 
requirements necessary for building well-functioning microfinance systems. These systems 
are important to ensure that there are clearly defined and predictable laws and regulations 
governing microleasing transactions, clear accounting standards, an appropriate and 
conducive tax regime, and the presence of a suitable regulatory and supervisory framework.   
 
In addition the commercial banking sector has an opportunity to offer microleasing as another 
product. However, it is imperative that these banks offer such a product through an 
independent entity to bolster independent thinking and an entrepreneurial philosophy for the 
staff of such an entity. In this way, the staff can be able to fully understand the needs of 
microbusinesses and be able to respond with appropriate services. 
 
Lastly, there are many unresolved strategic issues that are facing the financial services sector, 
particularly microfinance, it will require a radically different mindset if it is to succeed in 
expanding services to the poor and unbanked population in South Africa. Most importantly, 
the industry needs to adapt and employ promising models such as microleasing, if it is to 
avoid an onerous solution imposed on it by government, in its altruistic efforts to bolster 
access to credit for all South Africans, including the poor in remote rural environments. On 
the other hand, community leaders must stress the need for self-reliance, a determination to 
be less dependent on “hand-outs” and for every South African to address the culture of 
dependency inherent in waiting for others to fix the problems that many people encounter. In 
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this way, local solutions developed by South Africans and adapted from global best-practices 
to solve local problems will have a better chance of succeeding, since they will be able to 
resonate with the targeted communities. 
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